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It is my pleasure to present to you the second issue of Études Ricoeuriennes/Ricœur Studies 
(ERRS). I had the honor of being invited to serve as a guest editor for this issue, after having co-
organized the International Symposium Reading Ricœur Once Again: Hermeneutics and Practical 
Philosophy (Lisbon, July 2010). The symposium had more than one hundred participants, 
including Axel Honneth who delivered the final keynote address. More than a dozen 
presentations on the topic of recognition were made, and a few of them are included in this issue. 
Consequently, this special number should not be taken to be a mere publication of proceedings, 
as both the call for papers and the tight selection procedure attest. The issue contains 
contributions from Ricœur scholars as well as recognition scholars. The mixture of different 
research backgrounds underscores the interdisciplinarity and dialogue affirmed by the journal’s 
mission. 
If it is true that we can find in Ricœur’s writings a practical philosophy or, to borrow the 
words of Johann Michel, a “philosophy of human action,” then we must consider his redefinition 
of the concept and practices of recognition as a fundamental part of that philosophy. And if it is 
true that Ricœur always showed, both in his philosophical anthropology and in his more directly 
political writings, a deep concern for the fragility of the human being and a bright hope for the 
development of human capacities, it must also be said that it was in the later period of his 
production, starting from the 1990s until 2004, that this specific emphasis on practical philosophy 
came to the fore.  
As such, The Course of Recognition assumes a particular status. This book did not have a 
reception as enthusiastic as Time and Narrative or Oneself as Another, nor as polemical as Freud and 
Philosophy or Memory, History, Forgetting. In fact, seven years after its publication, it seems as if 
scholars are still trying to figure out what status to grant it.  Is it a minor work or the final 
masterpiece that changed the core of Ricœur’s philosophy? I won’t subscribe to either of the 
above alternatives here. This issue is born of a wager: that even if The Course of Recognition could 
certainly have had a different form and could have been clearer in some of its claims, it is 
nonetheless both the definitive form of Ricœur’s anthropology and practical philosophy (in the 
way it radically expands his list of capacities) and a valuable contribution to contemporary 
discussions on recognition theory. It is, as with Ricœur’s other works, an original and thought-
provoking book whose claims should be put to the test in a rational-critical debate. 
By inviting us to think about the “rule-governed polysemy” of the uses of the word 
“recognition” and by bringing together so many different philosophical constellations (after all, 
what could Kant’s Rekognition and Hegel’s Anerkennung have in common?), Ricœur urges us to 
think more. Ricœur is showing us that there is more to be said about recognition than we usually 
acknowledge. For our philosopher, the debates concerning mutual recognition or the politics of 
multiculturalism are only a small moment in the big picture of recognition. As a consequence, his 
account of the radical potential of human action and the prospects of a decent society is unique. 
The wager is that his redefinition of the concept and practices of recognition are still valuable to 
understand how we could, theoretically speaking, arrive at a society whose members are duly 
recognized. 
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Consequently, if this claim is correct, The Course of Recognition would contain important 
elements both for understanding recognition from a philosophical standpoint – including the 
moments of recognition as identification and recognition of oneself often disregarded in the 
elaborations on mutual recognition – and for reshaping the practices of mutual recognition, 
namely, by adding the possibility of a peaceful recognition in his famous “clearings” of 
recognition.  
The contributions that constitute the thematic portion of this issue analyze Ricœur’s 
stance on recognition from very different angles. The first pair of articles focuses on the 
significance of recognition. The first article, Jean-Luc Amalric’s “Affirmation originaire, 
attestation et reconnaissance: Le cheminement de l’anthropologie philosophique ricœurienne” 
places recognition at the heart of Ricœur’s philosophical anthropology. Reconstructing three 
different phases of this anthropology (from the fallible man of the 1960s and the capable man of 
the 1990s to the way attestation transforms itself in recognition in 2004), Amalric’s article has the 
merit of showing a certain continuity in Ricœur’s anthropological project, by arguing that 
attestation and recognition are ultimately rooted in a growing comprehension and deepening of 
Nabert’s notion of “original affirmation.” Showing a remarkable knowledge of Ricœur’s 
philosophy and its evolution, Amalric helps us to understand the way Ricœur redefines the 
unstable equilibrium between identity and alterity, of which his reflections on recognition are a 
decisive stage. 
The second article, Arto Laitinen’s “Ricœur’s Surprising Take on Recognition”, focuses 
directly on the argument presented in The Course of Recognition. Given Ricœur’s earlier 
contributions to the development of thick identities and their intersubjective character, Laitinen 
undertakes a detailed discussion and an evaluation of the merits of this last book. In this thought-
provoking article, we are reminded of the aspects that Ricœur didn’t fully develop in The Course 
of Recognition (such as, recognition as validity) and, in a very interesting manner, the author tries 
to show what other paths the Course could have taken.  While assuming an overall critical stance 
towards the book and trying to respond to Ricœur’s main claims, Laitinen nonetheless also 
emphasizes its merits and its uses for the construction of our own recognition-theoretical models. 
The second pair of articles - Sebastian Purcell’s “Recognition and Exteriority: Towards a 
Recognition-Theoretic Account of Globalization” and Silvia Pierosara’s “Asking for Narratives to 
be Recognized: the Moral of Histories” - each try to redefine Ricœurian recognition. In his highly 
original contribution, Purcell tries to redefine recognition in spatial terms, in order to address the 
concerns of those who inhabit the “underside of modernity.” Purcell claims that it is possible to 
use Ricœur’s account of recognition to sketch a framework for the amelioration of those who are 
the underprivileged of globalization processes. With the help of the claims of Enrique Dussel, 
Purcell addresses complicated problems such as the redistribution of recognition but also poses 
interesting questions to a standard theory of recognition, such as: are the conditions of 
development of social esteem necessarily impaired for those who inhabit the less privileged 
spaces of globalization and, eo ipso, do the people who inhabit the “center” automatically enjoy a 
higher degree of social esteem? If this is the case, Purcell’s paper certainly summons us to define 
the new imperatives of the redistribution of social recognition in transcultural and non-Western 
terms. 
Pierosara, on the other hand, draws a connection that is implicit but unexplored in 
Ricœur’s work. As is well known, one of the main features of the Ricœurian account of ipseity is 
its narrative character. In this paper, Pierosara argues that claims for recognition and social 
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visibility are intrinsically narrative. She claims that narratives have an inherently teleological 
character that constitutes the search for meaning. The claim for social esteem will therefore be 
narratively mediated; whoever gives an account of him or herself is implicitly trying to be 
legitimized in his or her values, choices, life stories; in a word, in his or her thick identity. 
Pierosara goes as far as stating that narrativity is our specific way of life; she eventually fleshes 
out the moral content of the claims for recognition, and connects it with the social actors’ quest 
for significance.  
The third pair of articles is comprised of Marianne Moyaert’s “Between Ideology and 
Utopia: Honneth and Ricœur on Symbolic Violence, Marginalization and Recognition” and my 
own “Paul Ricœur’s Utopia of Mutual Recognition”. Both of these contributions compare the 
recognition-theoretical models of Ricoeur and Honneth, in addition to highlighting the utopian 
nature of Ricœur’s approach. Moyaert’s paper, however, focuses in particular on the link 
between multiculturalism and the struggle for recognition, that is to say, on the struggles of 
minorities calling for cultural recognition in the public sphere. Her claim is that Honneth’s model 
loses much of its emancipatory power when applied to the struggle for cultural recognition. She 
forcefully argues that the prevailing standards of evaluation in a multicultural society should 
become intercultural and shows that struggles for recognition will not be successful if the 
symbolic order of society remains unaltered, because the law itself is not symbolically neutral. 
The law is ideologically embedded. She goes on to argue that the normative goal of the cultural 
struggle for recognition ought to be a difference-friendly society; but in order to do so, as she 
brilliantly shows, the ideological discourse of the majority must be denounced as such, and the 
symbolic order must therefore be changed. Ultimately, she emphasizes, as does Pierosara, the 
narrative character of struggles for recognition and the need for utopian counter-narratives to 
break up the dominant ideological discourse. Minorities must be able to regain authorship of 
their identity and to enter the public sphere with their story told from their perspective, which 
recalls Nancy Fraser’s notion of “subaltern counterpublics.”  
My own article reconstructs the debate between Ricœur and mainstream recognition 
scholars, as well as with the other figures, such as Boltanski, Thévenot and Hénaff, who had a 
direct influence in the way Ricœur fleshed out his alternative conception of recognition. It is 
argued that by connecting recognition with Ricœur’s notions of ideology and utopia, we are able 
to uncover a major blind spot in the standard model of recognition, and to help to get ourselves 
rid of ideological and reified forms of recognition. The claim is that both Honneth and Ricœur are 
aiming at societies whose members are duly recognized, but in radically different manners. 
Whereas Honneth has the most complex and powerful recognition model, one that must be, 
according to this interpretation, politicized in order to become relevant to social change, Ricœur 
offers a pure ethics of recognition, thereby aiming at social change, if only indirectly, in a 
different way. 
The last contribution to the thematic portion of this issue is an interview I conducted 
with Emmanuel Renault, “Reconnaissance, critique sociale et politique”, during the month of 
May, 2011. Renault is a leading scholar on the topic of recognition. Adopting a Marxist-Hegelian 
standpoint, he is actively engaged in the analysis of social reality in terms of recognition. In this 
interview, he gives a detailed account of the development of the paradigm of recognition over the 
last few decades as well as the role of Axel Honneth within this development. He also touches on 
many other topics, from the current social crisis to the politicization of recognition. Together, 
these different contributions make up an issue that far from being seen as an ending point, rather 
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pictures itself as one of the starting points for the debates around Ricœur and recognition. In its 
diversity, it aims to be as provisional and open to dialogue as any philosophical effort inspired by 
Paul Ricœur. 
 I would not like to end this introduction without expressing my debt to all those 
involved in preparing this special issue. First and foremost, my objective acknowledgment goes 
to Johann Michel and Scott Davidson, who prepared the whole volume with me. Their comments 
have been invaluable and their work tireless. I must also thank all the members of the Editorial 
Committee who helped in the reviewing process, choosing which papers should be included in 
this issue, and to Emmanuel Renault, who kindly accepted to offer his valuable insights and 
expertise on the topic of recognition. Last but not least, I would like to express my subjective 
recognition, in the form of gratitude, to Marta. From the hard work put into organizing and 
hosting the Lisbon symposium, to the encouragement needed to finish up the work for this 
special issue, her contribution has been precious all the way through. I would like to dedicate this 
issue to her. 
Gonçalo Marcelo 
Guest editor 
 
